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Abstract
In an industry where regulated firms interact with unregulated suppliers, we investigate
the welfare effects of a merger between regulated firms when efficiency gains are uncertain
before the merger and their realization becomes private information of the merged firm.
The optimal merger policy trades off potential efficiency gains against regulatory distortions
from informational problems. We show that, as a consequence of this trade-off, more intense
competition in unregulated segments of the market induces a more lenient merger policy.
However, the regulated firms’ diversification into a competitive segment can lead to a more
lenient merger policy when competition is weaker.
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1. Introduction
The adequate antitrust scrutiny of mergers between firms is a relevant policy issue in modern
countries. The US Horizontal Merger Guidelines (HMG), revised by the Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission in 2010, and the EC Merger Regulation reformed in 2004
acknowledge the relevance of cost synergies in merger control. Two major practical problems
recognized by antitrust authorities and courts concern the uncertainty about the magnitude of
efficiency gains before a merger takes place, and the merging firms’ privileged information about
the realization of efficiency gains. Antitrust authorities emphasize the issue of uncertainty, since
“efficiencies projected reasonably and in good faith by the merging firms may not be realized”
(HMG, Sect. 4). Moreover, as declared by Judge T. F. Hogan for the merger case of Staples
and Office Depot, “the Court agrees with the defendants that where, as here, the merger has
not yet been consummated, it is impossible to quantify precisely the efficiencies that it is will
generate” (US District Court for the District of Columbia, Civ. No. 97-701).1
The presence of asymmetric information about post-merger costs has also been recognized in
the merger debate, since “efficiencies are difficult to verify and quantify, in part because much
of the information relating to efficiencies is uniquely in the possession of the merging firms”
(HMG, Sect. 4).2 As Amir et al. (2009, p. 266) emphasize, “this first-to-know advantage thus
emerges as a natural candidate for the fundamental asymmetry that mergers seem to trigger in
favor of the merged firm”.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the welfare effects of a merger between regulated
firms, when efficiency gains from joint production are uncertain before the merger and their
realization becomes private information of the merged entity.
Despite the relevance of this phenomenon, mergers in regulated industries have so far re-
ceived little theoretical attention. Recent decades have witnessed merger waves in industries
which are in large part under regulatory control, such as electricity, gas, sanitation, telecom-
munications, transportation and water. The US Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs),
which provide regulated local telephone services as a result of the 1984 divestiture of AT&T,
have engaged after the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in a consolidation
process, which has reduced their number from seven to only three. Kwoka and Pollitt (2010)
report that in the US electricity industry more than 75 mergers occurred between 1994 and
2003, which affected half of the customers of all investor-owned electricity operating companies.
Since enterprises with large assets are usually involved, the relevance of this phenomenon in
terms of resources is definitely high. E.ON, one of the world’s largest electric utility providers,
was created in 2000 as a result of the merger between Veba and Viag valued at about 14 billion
dollars. The merger between Duke Energy and Progress Energy, realized in 2012 through a
transaction of about 32 billion dollars, has generated the largest energy utility in the US by
number of customers.3
1This conclusion is also supported by some empirical evidence. Motta (2004, Ch. 5, p. 242) states that
“merging parties often have a genuine tendency to overstate the benefits from combining their activities and
assets. Even strictly internal and confidential documents often report too optimistic an assessment of the merger’s
efficiency gains”.
2Quotations with emphasis added can be found at http://justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html.
3We refer to Cox and Portes (1998) for some relevant case studies of mergers in regulated industries.
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In recent decades, most regulated industries have been involved in a partial liberalization
process, which has increased the scope for demand interconnections between regulated and
unregulated goods. In the energy sector, transmission and distribution networks are typically
regulated, while retail services are often open to competition. Regulated local telephone services
coexist with unregulated telecommunications services, such as long-distance, broadband Internet
and digital cable telephone services. Regulated railways companies operate in competition with
unregulated long distance buses and airlines. In big cities, regulated public utilities run railways,
subways and buses, while competitive firms supply alternative services such as car sharing or
car rental.
In this paper, we characterize the optimal merger policy involving regulated firms, whose
task is to find a balance between the benefits of potential efficiency gains from the merger and the
costs of distortions in the regulatory policy due to the aforementioned informational problems
about efficiency gains. We explore this trade-off in a setting where a merger occurs between
two regulated firms that operate in two separate markets. As empirical evidence suggests, most
mergers in regulated industries involve firms that are established in different regions, since they
constitute local natural monopolies (e.g., electricity networks, local telephone services and local
public transportation). Each regulated firm interacts with unregulated suppliers since there is
some degree of substitutability or complementarity between regulated and unregulated goods.
For the sake of concreteness, we consider two standard forms of competition, namely, Bertrand
and Cournot competition, which are known to differ in the degree of intensity or toughness of
product market competition.
We show that the intensity of competition in the unregulated part of the market affects
the optimal merger policy. In particular, we find that, in the presence of uncertainty over
post-merger costs before the merger occurs, Bertrand competition in the unregulated segment
leads to a more lenient merger challenge rule than Cournot competition. To understand the
rationale for this result, it is important to realize that, when post-merger costs are uncertain,
an ex ante welfare-enhancing merger may eventually result in higher costs, namely, efficiency
losses, driven for instance by clashes between corporate cultures (e.g., White 1987).4 In this
case, even when post-merger costs become common knowledge, the regulated production is
reduced because regulated activities are more inefficient. Since Bertrand competition is more
intense than Cournot competition, Bertrand competitors react more aggressively to changes
in their demand stemming from regulated output reductions. As a consequence, more intense
competition relaxes the condition for allowing the merger.
Private information of the merged firm about the realization of post-merger cost synergies
strengthens this result. As it is well established in the incentive regulation literature (e.g., Baron
and Myerson 1982), a regulator finds it optimal to tolerate an allocative loss from the downward
output distortion for the inefficient firm in order to limit the (socially costly) informational rents
appropriated by the efficient firm. The prompter reaction of Bertrand competitors to reductions
in the regulated output with respect to Cournot competitors alleviates the allocative costs of
downward regulated output distortions and softens the regulator’s incentive problem.
Afterwards, we show that the optimal merger policy can be crucially affected by the regulated
4We refer to Section 3 for a discussion about the possibility of efficiency losses.
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firms’ participation in a competitive segment of the market. In the energy, telecommunications
and transportation sectors, regulated utilities may have affiliates in the liberalized part of the
market where they operate. While the intensity of Bertrand competition erodes firms’ profits
and therefore makes the regulated firms’ diversification into the unregulated segment inconse-
quential, things are different under Cournot competition. In particular, when the regulated and
unregulated goods are complements, competitive profits can discipline the merged firm’s strate-
gic behavior. The efficient merged firm has a weaker incentive to claim to be inefficient since
a lower regulated quantity due to cost misrepresentation reduces the demand and the profits
in the unregulated segment. The regulated firm’s internalization of competitive profits allevi-
ates the regulator’s incentive problem and relaxes merger policy. Therefore, if regulated firms
diversify into competitive segments of the market that provide complements for the regulated
goods, weaker competition can lead to a more lenient merger challenge rule.
To our knowledge, this paper constitutes the first attempt to shed some light on the welfare
effects of informational problems about efficiency gains driven by mergers between regulated
firms and to provide support for an assessment of the intensity of competition in markets where
merging regulated firms interact with unregulated suppliers. Despite the stylized formulation
for expositional purposes, with explicit functions and binomial asymmetric information about
efficiency gains, the principles underlying our results are fairly general. Our analysis may
therefore stimulate the theoretical and practical debate on antitrust and regulation policies.
2. Related literature
The emphasis on efficiency gains in merger reviews in unregulated markets traces back to the
seminal paper of Williamson (1968), which investigates the welfare trade-off between market
power and efficiency gains generated by a merger.
Our work is related to two main strands of the merger literature. The first strand explores
the role of pre-merger uncertainty and post-merger private information about efficiency gains.
Chone´ and Linnemer (2008) examine the welfare effects of uncertainty according to the curva-
ture of the social objective function but ignore the presence of asymmetric information after the
merger. Closer to our work is the paper of Amir et al. (2009), which analyzes the merger per-
formance when efficiency gains are uncertain before the merger and the merging firms privately
observe their realization after the merger. The authors show that a bilateral merger is profitable
if non-merging firms believe with a sufficiently high probability that the merger will engender
large efficiency gains, even though none actually realize. A further relevant contribution for our
purposes is Hamada (2012), which demonstrates that, as the variance of uncertainty about syn-
ergies grows, mergers generate larger expected profits and improve expected consumer surplus.
Calzolari and Scarpa (2011) explore the welfare effects of allowing a firm that operates in regu-
lated and competitive markets to combine its assets, which creates privately known economies
of scope. Contrary to these papers, we examine mergers between regulated firms.
The second strand of literature which is relevant for our purposes investigates the optimal
institutional design of regulated industries. We refer to Armstrong and Sappington (2007) for
a review on optimal regulation. In a setting with complementary products and private cost
information, Baron and Besanko (1992) and Gilbert and Riordan (1995) show that allowing a
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single firm to integrate production improves social welfare through a reduction in informational
rents. Iossa (1999) finds that (dis)integrated production tends to be preferred with substitutes
(complements) when asymmetric information concerns consumer demand. Contrary to these
contributions which ignore technological economies of scope and assume that markets are en-
tirely regulated, we explore the role of uncertainty and asymmetric information about efficiency
gains in an industry where regulated and unregulated firms interact.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 sets out the formal model. Section 4
derives the outcome in the absence of a merger. Section 5 considers the benchmark case of full
information about post-merger costs. Section 6 characterizes the optimal merger policy under
uncertainty and asymmetric information. Section 7 derives the optimal merger policy when
regulated firms diversify into a competitive segment of the market. Section 8 discusses some
assumptions of the model. Section 9 concludes and provides some implications for antitrust and
regulation policies. All formal proofs are collected in the Appendix.
3. The model
Setting We wish to investigate the welfare implications of a merger between two regulated
firms which operate in two separate markets, for instance two different regions of a country.
Each regulated firm interacts with unregulated suppliers since regulated and unregulated goods
exhibit some degree of product differentiation.
Following Singh and Vives (1984), consumer surplus gross of the payments to the firms in
each market i = 1, 2 is specified as
Ui = αqir + αqiu − 1
2
(
q2ir + q
2
iu + 2γqirqiu
)
, (1)
where qir and qiu denote the quantities for the regulated and unregulated goods in market
i. Moreover, α is a positive parameter, and γ ∈ (−1, 1) captures the degree of product dif-
ferentiation between regulated and unregulated goods. If γ > (<)0, goods are substitutes
(complements). To make our analysis more transparent, and without affecting our qualitative
results, we assume that the two markets are symmetric. This reflects the idea that mergers
in regulated industries usually involve local natural monopolies which provide the same service
(e.g., energy, telecommunications, transportation) but they operate in different regions and face
the same competitive segment in each region.5
The profit of regulated firm i = 1, 2 in the absence of a merger is
piir = Tir − cqir, (2)
where Tir is a transfer payment to the firm via the regulatory process (see below) and c is the
(constant) marginal cost of production.6
If the two regulated firms merge, we have a single regulated entity, whose profit becomes
pir = Tr − C (q1r, q2r; θ) , (3)
5In line with the main literature, we abstract from an analysis of the optimal degree of (de)regulation.
6Nothing substantial would change with non-linear, different marginal costs.
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where Tr is a transfer payment to the firm, and C (q1r, q2r; θ) = cq1r + cq2r − θq1rq2r represents
the total cost of production after the merger. This cost function captures in a simple and
natural manner the presence of interdependent costs.7 If θ = − ∂2C∂qir∂qjr > (<) 0, i, j = 1, 2,
i 6= j, joint production generates efficiency gains (losses), or (dis)economies of scope, since
a larger output for one product reduces (increases) the marginal cost of the other product.
Following Farrell and Shapiro (2001, pp. 692-693), we interpret efficiency gains as merger-
specific synergies obtained through the “intimate integration of the parties’ unique, hard-to-
trade assets”.8 Before the merger, the magnitude of cost synergies is uncertain. It is common
knowledge that with probability ν ∈ (0, 1) the merger entails efficiency gains θh > 0. Following
the main literature about uncertain efficiency gains (e.g., Amir et al. 2009), this probability
can be thought of as the common belief about the merged firm’s ability to achieve the posited
efficiency gains, given the information available about the case and possibly all previously
treated similar cases. After the merger, the merged firm privately learns the realization of cost
synergies. With complementary probability 1− ν, the merger results in efficiency losses θl < 0,
where ∆θ ≡ θh − θl > 0. Integrating production may entail higher costs, caused, for instance,
by clashes between corporate cultures and difficulties in melding two different managerial and
production systems. In the largest cross-national study on mergers over the period 1981-1998,
Gugler et al. (2003) conclude that only 29% of all mergers created efficiency gains. In regulated
industries such as electricity, railways and water, empirical investigations report that mergers
may entail efficiency losses (e.g., Bitzan and Wilson 2007; Kwoka and Pollitt 2010; Torres and
Morrison Paul 2006). In the theoretical literature, the presence of efficiency losses is modelled
in some recent contributions (e.g., Chone´ and Linnemer 2008; Hamada 2012).
Cost synergies constitute the only parameter of private information in our model. This allows
us to focus on the informational effects of the merger and makes our analysis more transparent.
Remarkably, this formulation is consistent with the common idea that a regulator can (at least
to some extent) extract the private information of monopolists operating in different regions by
implementing yardstick competition. After the merger, this becomes clearly more difficult, and
the new entity is in a better position to manipulate its costs.9
In the unregulated segment of each market, two firms s = 1, 2 provide a homogeneous good
and obtain profits piis = pisqis − cqis, where
∑2
s=1 qis ≡ qiu.10 The unregulated firms engage
either in Bertrand (price) competition or in Cournot (quantity) competition. The difference
between these two standard forms of competition captures in a simple and tractable manner
the intensity or toughness of product market competition.11 Since efficiency gains from the
merger must be merger-specific, they do not affect the competitive firms’ costs.
7See, e.g., Motta (2004, Ch. 8) and Calzolari and Scarpa (2009, 2011) for the use of this cost specification.
8We ignore savings on fixed costs which follow from a reduction in administrative and personnel costs after the
merger, since they do not affect our qualitative results. These synergies are viewed with skepticism by antitrust
authorities, because they typically stem from a mere output reorganization that could be achieved without the
merger (e.g., Motta 2004, Ch. 5).
9We refer to Section 8.1 for further discussion about this point.
10Our qualitative results carry over if we consider product differentiation (and possibly different costs) even
within the competitive segment of the market. Our analysis can also be generalized to the case of more than two
firms.
11In Section 9, we provide practical examples where Bertrand or Cournot competition tends to prevail.
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Using (1), the aggregate net consumer surplus in the two markets is given by
CS = U1 + U2 − (T1r + T2r)−
2∑
s=1
p1sq1s −
2∑
s=1
p2sq2s, (4)
with T1r + T2r being replaced by Tr in case of merger. A regulator is charged with maximizing
welfare in (4) when designing the regulatory policy.12 In the absence of the merger, the regulator
offers a contract {Tir, qir} to regulated firm i = 1, 2. If the merger occurs, the contract offered
to the regulated merged entity is {Tr, q1r, q2r}. It is worth noting that the regulatory contract
specifies a transfer and a quantity for each good, irrespective of the mode of competition in
the unregulated segment. Using standard techniques, our results carry over if we allow for
regulation of prices for regulated goods.13
The welfare standard in (4) is also relevant to merger policy. This reflects the common
perception that, at least in Europe and in the US, antitrust authorities focus on consumer
surplus in merger investigations (e.g., Motta 2004, Ch. 1).14
Timing We consider the following sequence of events.
(I) The regulator decides whether to allow the merger between regulated firms or not.
(II) If the merger is not allowed, the regulator makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of a regulatory
policy to each regulated firm, which can either accept or reject the offer. If merger is allowed,
the merged entity privately learns the realization of its cost type θ ∈ {θh, θl}. Afterwards, the
regulator makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of a regulatory policy to the merged entity, which can
either accept or reject the offer (the reservation utility is normalized to zero).
(III) If the regulatory offer(s) is (are) accepted, regulation is implemented.
(IV) Competition in the unregulated segment takes place.
In summary, our model is a two-stage game. After deciding on the merger, in the first stage
the regulator determines the regulatory policy. In the second stage, competition occurs in the
unregulated segment. We solve this game by backward induction.
Some remarks are in order at this point. We do not distinguish between the antitrust au-
thority and the regulatory agency, since in practice they usually have concurrent jurisdiction
over merger reviews in regulated industries and cooperate to reach a final decision.15 Moreover,
we consider a single regulator charged with controlling both markets. In practice, however, dif-
ferent regulators are sometimes established, one for each market, and miscoordination problems
might occur after the merger. While no externalities arise on the demand side since consumers
are in different markets, the cost function in (3) of the merged firm is nonseparable in the two
regulated outputs and therefore assigning each regulator the control of a part of the merged
firm’s profits cannot be done in an unambiguous way. To cope with regulatory miscoordination
12Without loss of generality, we neglect the social cost of collecting funds through distortionary taxation to
finance regulated production. This increases unnecessarily further the cost of transfers in the welfare function and
does not affect our qualitative conclusions (Armstrong and Sappington 2007). In the same vein, our qualitative
results go through if we allow for a weight (lower than 1) attached to profits in the welfare standard in (4).
13Computations are available upon request.
14Theoretical foundations can be found in Neven and Ro¨ller (2005).
15Miscoordination between the antitrust authority and the regulator would introduce additional issues which
are outside the scope of this paper.
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problems, in practice a regulator with larger jurisdiction is usually involved, such as the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for mergers and acquisitions of energy utilities in the
US. In other cases, active cooperation is promoted between regulators. To focus on the welfare
effects of informational problems about efficiency gains, we abstract from the additional issues
arising from potential miscoordination between regulators.
In line with relevant contributions to the merger literature (e.g., Amir et al. 2009; Chone´
and Linnemer 2008; Hamada 2012), the realization of cost synergies occurs after the merger. As
discussed in the introduction, practitioners acknowledge that cost synergies cannot be precisely
quantified before a merger has been consummated. Moreover, the implementation of regulatory
contracting naturally precedes the competition stage. This reflects the complexity of regulatory
rules and procedures, which are more difficult to alter than market decisions.
Finally, we take as exogenously given the merger decision of the regulated firms. Section
8.2 is devoted to a discussion of the firms’ incentives to merge.
4. The case where the merger is not allowed
Let qkiu (qir), k = b, c, be the second-stage total output in the unregulated segment of market i
under Bertrand or Cournot competition and pkiu (.) the corresponding price. When the merger
is not allowed, the two markets are fully separated, and therefore the regulator’s problem of
maximizing welfare in (4) can be split into two different maximization problems.
Replacing Tir with piir from regulated firm i’s profit function in (2) and using the second-
stage competition outcome, in the first stage the regulator’s objective to maximize welfare in
market i can be written in the following way
max
qir,piir
(α− c) qir + αqkiu −
1
2
q2ir −
1
2
(
qkiu
)2 − γqirqiu − pkiuqkiu − piir s.t. piir ≥ 0,
where the constraint ensures that the regulated firm in market i accepts the regulatory contract.
The following lemma formalizes the main results when the merger is not permitted.
Lemma 1 If the merger is not allowed, under Bertrand competition in the unregulated segment,
the outputs in market i are
qbir = q
b
iu =
α− c
1 + γ
.
Under Cournot competition in the unregulated segment, the outputs in market i are
qcir =
9− 4γ
9− 4γ2 (α− c) ; q
c
iu =
6 (1− γ)
9− 4γ2 (α− c) .
Since Bertrand is more intense than Cournot competition, unregulated output is higher
when firms compete a` la Bertrand. To mitigate the welfare loss from Cournot competition, the
quantity for each substitutable (complementary) regulated good increases (decreases).
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5. Full information
We now examine the benchmark case where the magnitude of efficiency gains (losses) θ ∈ {θh, θl}
is common knowledge before the merger takes place. When the merger is allowed, after replacing
Tr with pir from the merged firm’s profit function in (3) and using the second-stage competition
outcome, the regulator’s problem of maximizing welfare in (4) becomes
max
qir,pir
2∑
s=1
[
(α− c) qir + αqkiu −
1
2
q2ir −
1
2
(
qkiu
)2 − γqirqkiu − pkiuqkiu]+θq1rq2r−pir s.t. pir ≥ 0,
where the constraint guarantees that the merged firm accepts the regulatory contract.
We summarize the main results of the maximization program in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Suppose that there is full information about θ ∈ {θh, θl} before the merger. Then,
if the merger is allowed, under Bertrand competition in the unregulated segment, the outputs in
market i are
qmbir =
1− γ
1− γ2 − θ (α− c) ; q
mb
iu =
1− γ − θ
1− γ2 − θ (α− c) .
Under Cournot competition in the unregulated segment, the outputs in market i are
qmcir =
9− 4γ
9− 4γ2 − 9θ (α− c) ; q
mc
iu =
6 (1− γ − θ)
9− 4γ2 − 9θ (α− c) .
Lemmas 1 and 2 indicate that a merger leads to a larger regulated production if and only
if it creates efficiency gains (θ = θh > 0). If goods are substitutes, the higher (lower) regulated
output due to efficiency gains (losses) entails a reduction (raise) in the unregulated quantity.
The opposite clearly holds when goods are complements.
We can now state the following result.
Lemma 3 With full information about θ ∈ {θh, θl}, the merger is welfare enhancing if and only
if θ = θh, irrespective of the mode of competition in the unregulated segment.
In the absence of informational problems about post-merger costs, the merger desirability
only depends on the magnitude of these costs. A merger should be approved if and only if it
engenders efficiency gains, and the mode of competition prevailing in the unregulated segment
is therefore inconsequential.
6. Unknown efficiencies
Now, we show that the natural result in Lemma 3 does not holds when post-merger costs are
uncertain before the merger and their realization becomes private information of the merged
firm.
6.1. Uncertainty
In order to better appreciate the impact of uncertainty and asymmetric information, we first
consider the case where efficiency gains (losses) are uncertain before the merger occurs and
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become common knowledge after the merger. Since the regulator is fully informed about the
post-merger costs when designing the regulatory policy, the results in Lemma 2 still apply.
However, the regulator’s merger decision now takes place before costs realize.
The following proposition derives the optimal merger policy under uncertain efficiency gains.
Proposition 1 Suppose that θ ∈ {θh, θl} is uncertain before the merger and becomes common
knowledge after the merger. Then, under Bertrand competition in the unregulated segment, the
merger is ex ante welfare enhancing if and only if
ν > − 1− γ
2 − θh
(1− γ2) ∆θθl ≡ ν
b ∈ (0, 1) . (5)
Under Cournot competition in the unregulated segment, the merger is ex ante welfare enhancing
if and only if
ν > −9− 4γ
2 − 9θh
(9− 4γ2) ∆θ θl ≡ ν
c ∈ (0, 1) . (6)
Proposition 1 reveals the natural result that, when the magnitude of costs generated by the
merger is uncertain, the merger should be approved only if the probability of efficiency gains is
relatively high. More relevantly, conditions (5) and (6) show that, in the presence of uncertainty,
the form of competition prevailing in the unregulated part of the market affects the optimal
merger policy.
This leads to the following result.
Proposition 2 We have νc ≥ νb, where the equality holds if and only if γ = 0.
Proposition 2 shows that Bertrand competition in the unregulated part of the market re-
laxes the condition for allowing the merger. As the regulator’s merger decision is made under
uncertainty about cost realization, an ex ante welfare-enhancing merger may eventually result
in efficiency losses, namely, higher post-merger costs, which lead to lower regulated production.
Since Bertrand is more intense than Cournot competition, Bertrand suppliers react more ag-
gressively to reductions in regulated production. This alleviates the welfare losses from more
inefficient post-merger regulated activities. As a consequence, more severe competition in the
unregulated segment of the market allows the regulator to establish a merger challenge rule
which is more lenient with the merging firms.
6.2. Uncertainty and asymmetric information
We now consider the case where cost synergies are uncertain before the merger and privately
observed by the merged firm after the merger. Invoking the revelation principle (e.g., Myer-
son 1979), the regulator can restrict attention to a direct incentive compatible contract menu
{(Trh, q1rh, q2rh) , (Trl, q1rl, q2rl)} that induces the merged firm to truthfully reveal its cost type
θ ∈ {θh, θl}. Using the merged firm’s profit in (3), in addition to the participation constraints
10
pirh ≥ 0 and pirl ≥ 0, the following incentive compatibility constraints must be fulfilled
pirh = Trh − cq1rh − cq2rh + θhq1rhq2rh
≥ Trl − cq1rl − cq2rl + θhq1rlq2rl
= pirl + ∆θq1rlq2rl (7)
pirl = Trl − cq1rl − cq2rl + θlq1rlq2rl
≥ Trh − cq1rh − cq2rh + θlq1rhq2rh
= pirh −∆θq1rhq2rh. (8)
Conditions (7) and (8) ensure that the merged firm does not benefit from misreporting its
private information.
Following standard techniques, we restrict attention to the incentive constraint (7) for the
efficient firm and the participation constraint pirl ≥ 0 for the inefficient firm, which are binding at
the optimal contract.16 Substituting these binding constraints and the second-stage competition
outcome into (4), the regulator’s maximization problem can be written in the following way
max
qirh,qirl
ν
{
2∑
i=1
qis
[
(α− c) qirh + αqkiuh −
1
2
q2irh −
1
2
(
qkiuh
)2 − γqirhqkiuh − pkiuhqkiuh]
+θhq1rhq2rh −∆θq1rlq2rl}+ (1− ν)
×
{
2∑
i=1
[
(α− c) qirl + αqkiul −
1
2
q2irl −
1
2
(
qkiul
)2 − γqirlqkiul − pkiulqkiul]+ θlq1rlq2rl
}
,
where the two expressions in curly brackets represent the welfare generated with the efficient
and inefficient firm, respectively. After defining
φ (ν) ≡ ν
1− ν , (9)
we are able to formalize the main results of the maximization program in the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Suppose that θ ∈ {θh, θl} is uncertain before the merger and becomes private infor-
mation of the merged firm after the merger. If the merger is allowed, under Bertrand competition
in the unregulated segment, the outputs in market i are
q˜mbirh =
1− γ
1− γ2 − θh (α− c) ; q˜
mb
irl =
1− γ
1− γ2 − θl + ∆θφ (α− c)
q˜mbiuh =
1− γ − θh
1− γ2 − θh (α− c) ; q˜
mb
iul =
1− γ − θl + ∆θφ
1− γ2 − θl + ∆θφ (α− c) .
16This result follows because, if either constraint were slack, the regulator could offer an alternative contract
which reduces the transfer to the merged firm and increases welfare in (4). In the proof of Lemma 4 (provided in
the Appendix), we show that the two remaining constraints, namely, the participation constraint for the efficient
firm pirh ≥ 0 and the incentive constraint (8) for the inefficient firm, are slack in equilibrium.
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Under Cournot competition in the unregulated segment, the outputs in market i are
q˜mcirh =
9− 4γ
9− 4γ2 − 9θh (α− c) ; q˜
mc
irl =
9− 4γ
9− 4γ2 − 9θl + 9∆θφ (α− c)
q˜mciuh =
6 (1− γ − θh)
9− 4γ2 − 9θh (α− c) ; q˜
mc
iul =
6 (1− γ − θl + ∆θφ)
9− 4γ2 − 9θl + 9∆θφ (α− c) .
A comparison of the results in Lemmas 2 and 4 reveals the familiar trade-off between alloca-
tive efficiency and the firm’s rent extraction in the presence of asymmetric information (e.g.,
Baron and Myerson 1982). The production of the efficient firm coincides with that under full
information (“no distortion at the top” result). However, the regulator finds it optimal to reduce
the output of the inefficient firm in order to limit the (socially costly) informational rents in (7)
to the efficient firm. The quantities for both goods of the inefficient merged firm are distorted
downward, since asymmetric information concerns the costs of joint production.
These regulatory distortions affect in a predictable way the production in the unregulated
segment of each market. Irrespective of the mode of competition, the substitutability (com-
plementarity) between goods implies that the lower regulated production of the inefficient firm
stimulates (dampens) the demand for the unregulated good.
Equipped with the results in Lemma 4, we can characterize the optimal merger policy in
the presence of uncertainty and asymmetric information.
Proposition 3 Suppose that θ ∈ {θh, θl} is uncertain before the merger and becomes private
information of the merged firm after the merger. Then, under Bertrand competition in the
unregulated segment, the merger is ex ante welfare enhancing if and only if
ν > − 1− γ
2 − θh
θ2h − (1− γ2) θl
θl ≡ ν˜b ∈
(
νb, 1
)
. (10)
Under Cournot competition in the unregulated segment, the merger is ex ante welfare enhancing
if and only if
ν > − 9− 4γ
2 − 9θh
9θ2h − (9− 4γ2) θl
θl ≡ ν˜c ∈ (νc, 1) . (11)
When efficiency gains are uncertain before the merger and their realization becomes private
information of the merged firm, the merger yields a trade-off between the benefits of potential
efficiency gains and the social costs of regulatory distortions. The combination of asymmetric
information and uncertainty complicates the regulator’s informational problem. Therefore,
irrespective of the mode of competition, the regulator sets a stricter merger challenge rule.
We are now in a position to state the following result.
Proposition 4 We have ν˜c − ν˜b ≥ νc − νb ≥ 0, where the equality holds if and only if γ = 0.
As Figure 1 illustrates, asymmetric information strengthens the condition for allowing the
merger under Cournot competition to a larger extent than the corresponding condition under
Bertrand competition. This increases the sensitivity of merger policy to the intensity of com-
petition in the unregulated segment of the market. The presence of asymmetric information
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Figure 1: Merger policy
in addition to uncertainty aggravates the regulator’s informational problem. We know from
Lemma 4 that this translates into a further reduction in the regulated output of the inefficient
firm in order to reduce the informational rents appropriated by the efficient firm. The higher
intensity of Bertrand competition mitigates the associated welfare losses to a larger extent
than Cournot competition. Hence, the combination of pre-merger uncertainty and post-merger
asymmetric information about synergies induces the regulator to increase the toughness of the
merger challenge rule in response to weaker competition in the unregulated part of the market.
We can see from Figure 1 that the degree of differentiation between regulated and unreg-
ulated goods affects the optimal merger policy. A higher demand interdependence results in
a more lenient merger policy, irrespective of the mode of competition. This is because the
competitive segment can alleviate to a greater extent the allocative losses in the regulated part
of market driven by informational problems. In the light of our previous discussion, it does
not come entirely as a surprise that this effect is more pronounced under Bertrand than under
Cournot competition, since Bertrand competitors respond more efficiently to regulatory distor-
tions. Therefore, if we interpret the degree of substitutability as a measure of the strength of
competition between regulated and unregulated firms, we can conclude that more intense com-
petition both among unregulated firms and between regulated and unregulated firms induces a
more lenient merger challenge rule.
7. Diversification into the unregulated segment
In practice, regulated firms can be active in a competitive part of the market as well. Regulated
utilities that provide energy transmission and distribution may engage in competitive retail
services. Regulated suppliers of basic local telephone services may also offer long-distance
telephone and broadband Internet services at unregulated rates. In this section, we investigate
the implications for the design of the optimal merger policy that arise when regulated firms
diversify into a competitive segment of the market.
In line with the most common regulatory practices in Europe and in the US, we assume that
regulated activities of a firm are legally unbundled from its competitive activities. This entails
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separate accounts for regulated and competitive operations so that provision of each commodity
is stand-alone profitable, and the regulator is only allowed to control regulated activities.17 As
Vickers (1995, p. 14) suggests, a realistic formulation of the participation constraint requires
that, as in the absence of diversification, a firm at least break even in its regulated activities.
Moreover, in the literature on legal unbundling (e.g., Cremer and De Donder 2013; Ho¨ffler and
Kranz 2011; Sibley and Weisman 1998), a regulated firm is entitled to receive the competitive
profits but cannot interfere in the operations of the competitive affiliate, which independently
maximizes its own profits. In our setting, the maximization of competitive profits follows
irrespective of whether the affiliate cares about its own profits or total profits, since regulated
profits are entirely determined by the regulatory contract.
For our aims, it is important to recognize that this discussion implies that the results in
the absence of a merger in Section 4 remain unchanged, and therefore Lemma 1 still applies.18
However, the regulated firm’s diversification into the unregulated segment of the market affects
the firm’s incentive to strategically manipulate its private information about the efficiency gains
from the merger, since it internalizes the impact of its behavior on the profits of the competitive
affiliate.
When unregulated suppliers engage in Bertrand competition, profits are competed away.
Hence, the regulated firm’s diversification is inconsequential and our previous results are unaf-
fected. We show that diversification into a Cournot segment leads to results of some interest.
As in the baseline model, we consider two identical competitive firms s = 1, 2 in each market
i = 1, 2, which have profits piis (qir). Regulated firm i now owns one competitive subsidiary
(say, firm 1) in the market where it operates, whose profits are pii1 (qir).
19 Since the subsidiary
maximizes its own profits, the outcome in the competition stage is unchanged.
If the merger is allowed, the new regulated entity controls two competitive firms, one in
each market. The merged firm cares about the sum of regulated and unregulated profits when
manipulating its private information. Formally, the incentive compatibility constraints are given
by
pirh + pi
11 (q1rh) + pi
21 (q2rh) = Trh − cq1rh − cq2rh + θhq1rhq2rh + pi11 (q1rh) + pi21 (q2rh)
≥ Trl − cq1rl − cq2rl + θhq1rlq2rl + pi11 (q1rl) + pi21 (q2rl)
= pirl + ∆θq1rlq2rl + pi
11 (q1rl) + pi
21 (q2rl)
17For instance, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides that the US incumbent local exchange carriers
can obtain a reasonable profit from regulated activities. Earnings from unregulated activities are not relevant to
the definition of a reasonable profit (Sidak and Spulber 1998, Ch. 9).
18This conclusion deserves a remark. If goods are complements, the diversified regulated firm is willing to
accept the regulatory contract when it obtains non-negative profits from regulated activities. This is not the
case under substitutability, since regulated production reduces the demand and the profits in the unregulated
segment. In order to induce the regulated firm to accept the regulatory contract, the regulator could prohibit
the regulated firm’s diversification into the unregulated segment when it rejects a contract which guarantees
non-negative regulated profits. If this is not feasible, a further constraint should be introduced, which ensures
the firm’s participation in the regulatory relationship. It can be shown that this additional constraint does not
alter the qualitative comparison between merger challenge rules under Bertrand and Cournot competition, and
therefore our main results carry over.
19Our qualitative results carry over when only one regulated firm diversifies into the competitive segment. In
Section 9, we discuss the case in which one regulated firm expands into the unregulated segment of the market
where the other regulated firm operates.
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pirl + pi
11 (q1rl) + pi
21 (q2rl) = Trl − cq1rl − cq2rl + θlq1rlq2rl + pi11 (q1rl) + pi21 (q2rl)
≥ Trh − cq1rh − cq2rh + θlq1rhq2rh + pi11 (q1rh) + pi21 (q2rh)
= pirh −∆θq1rhq2rh + pi11 (q1rh) + pi21 (q2rh) .
From the second-stage Cournot competition the profits of the subsidiary in market i are
pii1 (qir) =
(α−c−γqir)2
9 , i = 1, 2. Then, the incentive constraints can be rewritten after some
manipulation in the following way
pirh ≥ pirl + ∆θq1rlq2rl + γ
9
∑
i = 12 (2α− 2c− γqirh − γqirl) (qirh − qirl) (12)
pirl ≥ pirh −∆θq1rhq2rh + γ
9
∑
i = 12 (2α− 2c− γqirh − γqirl) (qirl − qirh) . (13)
Adding (12) and (13) yields
q1rhq2rh ≥ q1rlq2rl. (14)
As in Section 6, we restrict attention to the incentive constraint (12) for the efficient firm
and the participation constraint pirl ≥ 0 for the inefficient firm, which are therefore binding
at the optimal contract. This approach is justified if condition (14) holds, which constitutes a
necessary condition for incentive compatibility.
Substituting the binding constraints and the second-stage Cournot outcome into (4), the
regulator’s maximization problem is given by
max
qirh,qirl
ν
{∑
i = 12
[
(α− c) qirh + αqkiuh −
1
2
q2irh −
1
2
(
qkiuh
)2 − γqirhqkiuh − pkiuhqkiuh]
+θhq1rhq2rh −∆θq1rlq2rl − γ
9
∑
i = 12 (2α− 2c− γqirh − γqirl) (qirh − qirl)
}
+ (1− ν)
×
{∑
i = 12
[
(α− c) qirl + αqkiul −
1
2
q2irl −
1
2
(
qkiul
)2 − γqirlqkiul − pkiulqkiul]+ θlq1rlq2rl} .
The main results of the maximization program are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 Suppose that θ ∈ {θh, θl} is uncertain before the merger and becomes private infor-
mation of the merged firm after the merger. Moreover, suppose that the regulated firms diversify
into the unregulated segment, where competition takes place a` la Cournot. Then, if the merger
is allowed, the outputs in market i are
q˜mcdirh =
3− 2γ
3− 2γ2 − 3θh (α− c) ; q˜
mcd
irl =
9− 4γ + 2γφ
9− 4γ2 − 9θl + (2γ2 + 9∆θ)φ (α− c)
q˜mcdiuh =
6 (1− γ − θh)
9− 6γ2 − 9θh (α− c) ; q˜
mcd
iul =
6 (1− γ − θl + ∆θφ)
9− 4γ2 − 9θl + (2γ2 + 9∆θ)φ (α− c) .
The diversification into a Cournot segment crucially affects the regulatory policy designed for
the merged firm. When goods are substitutes, the efficient merged firm has a stronger incentive
to claim to be inefficient, since a lower regulated quantity due to cost misrepresentation increases
the demand and the profits in the unregulated segment. In fact, the incentive constraint (12)
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is more severe than the constraint (7). As Lemmas 4 and 5 reveal, the regulator reduces the
quantity of the efficient firm, q˜mcdirh < q˜
mc
irh, and increases the quantity of the inefficient firm,
q˜mcdirl > q˜
mc
irl , in order to curb the informational rents in (12).
The reverse occurs when goods are complements. A lower regulated quantity due to cost
misrepresentation now reduces the demand and profits in the unregulated segment, which mit-
igates the regulator’s incentive problem. As Lemmas 4 and 5 indicate, the regulator prefers to
increase the wedge between the regulated output of the efficient firm and that of the inefficient
firm, namely, q˜mcdirh > q˜
mc
irh and q˜
mcd
irl < q˜
mc
irl , since this allows a higher rent extraction.
Equipped with the results in Lemma 5 and using (9), we can now formalize the merger
policy when the regulated firms expand into the unregulated segment.
Proposition 5 Suppose that θ ∈ {θh, θl} is uncertain before the merger and becomes private
information of the merged firm after the merger. Moreover, suppose that the regulated firms
diversify into the unregulated segment, where competition takes place a` la Cournot. Then,
(i) when goods are substitutes, i.e., γ ≥ 0, there exists a threshold θ∗h (γ) ≥ 0 (where θ∗h = 0
if and only if γ = 0) such that for θh ≤ θ∗h the merger is never ex ante welfare enhancing. For
θh > θ
∗
h the merger is ex ante welfare enhancing if and only if φ (ν) > φ˜
c
d, where φ˜
c
d > 0 is given
by
− (9− 4γ)2 (3− 2γ2 − 3θh) θl
∆θ
[
2γ (57γ − 8γ3 − 54) + 3θh (9− 4γ)2
]
+ 2γ2
[
6 (1− γ)2 + θh (21 + 8γ2 − 24γ)
] ; (15)
(ii) when goods are complements, i.e., γ < 0, the merger is ex ante welfare enhancing if and
only if φ (ν) > φ˜cd.
We know from the discussion following Lemma 5 that the regulated firms’ diversification
into a competitive segment which provides substitutes for the regulated goods complicates the
regulator’s incentive problem. As Proposition 5 reveals, when the magnitude of efficiency gains
the merger may generate is small enough, the regulator prefers to block the merger. Otherwise,
the merger is allowed if the probability of efficiency gains is relatively high.
In order to investigate the impact of diversification on the optimal merger policy, we rewrite
the merger conditions (10) and (11) as follows
φ (ν) > −1− γ
2 − θh
θh∆θ
θl ≡ φ˜b = φ˜bd (16)
φ (ν) > −9− 4γ
2 − 9θh
9θh∆θ
θl ≡ φ˜c. (17)
We can now state the following conclusion.
Proposition 6 Suppose that θ ∈ {θh, θl} is uncertain before the merger and becomes private
information of the merged firm after the merger. Then,
(i) when goods are substitutes, i.e., γ ≥ 0, we have φ˜cd ≥ φ˜c ≥ φ˜b, where the equality holds if
and only if γ = 0;
(ii) when goods are complements, i.e., γ < 0, we have φ˜cd < φ˜
c. Moreover, there exists a
threshold θ˜h (γ) > 0, with
∂θ˜h
∂γ > 0, such that for θh < θ˜h we have φ˜
b > φ˜cd.
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Figure 2: Merger policy under diversification
As Figure 2 illustrates, when goods are substitutes the regulated firms’ diversification into
the Cournot segment induces the regulator to establish a stricter merger challenge rule. This
is a consequence of the firm’s stronger incentive to manipulate its private information after the
merger.
When goods are complements, different forces are at work. The regulated firm’s diversifi-
cation under Cournot competition alleviates the regulator’s incentive problem, which relaxes
merger policy, i.e., φ˜cd < φ˜
c. The incentive benefits of diversification can be so large that the
result derived in Proposition 4 is reversed, and weaker competition leads to a more lenient
merger policy, i.e., φ˜b > φ˜cd.
It is worth noting that a higher degree of complementarity softens the optimal merger pol-
icy irrespective of the mode of competition, since ∂φ˜
b
∂γ > 0 and
∂φ˜cd
∂γ > 0 for γ < 0. Proposition
6 indicates that the optimal merger policy under Cournot competition is more lenient than
under Bertrand competition if θh < θ˜h (γ). As θ˜h increases with γ, a higher degree of comple-
mentarity strengthens this condition. As a result, when goods are not close complements, the
aforementioned incentive benefits of diversification into a weakly competitive segment outweigh
the allocative benefits of intense competition derived in Propositions 2 and 4. When the degree
of complementarity is high enough, the opposite may occur, and the latter benefits tend to
prevail.
The result of a more lenient merger policy under Cournot competition is even stronger in
the presence of economies of scope between regulated and unregulated activities. As Calzolari
and Scarpa (2011) show, a lower regulated quantity that follows from cost misrepresentation
increases the (marginal) costs of unregulated operations, which induces the Cournot competitors
of the diversified regulated firm to expand their production. Consequently, Cournot competition
mitigates the regulator’s incentive problem and leads to a softer merger challenge rule.
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8. Robustness
We now discuss some assumptions of the model in order to gain insights into the robustness of
the results.
8.1. Efficiency gains
Following the main literature on uncertain efficiency gains (e.g., Amir et al. 2009; Chone´ and
Linnemer 2008), we assume that antitrust authorities and merging firms share the same beliefs
about the realization of synergies. In practice, antitrust authorities seek to extract any superior
information of the merging firms with the request of convincing documentation about efficiency
claims. The common knowledge probability of efficiency gains can be thought of as the average
value of comparable mergers or post-merger simulations accepted by antitrust authorities.
Furthermore, in our model the main informational advantage of merging firms is that they
privately learn the realization of post-merger costs. Abstracting from the complexities that
arise from regulatory limited commitment, one might claim that by its very nature this type of
informational asymmetry is transitory, since the regulator could revise the regulatory policy and
remove any distortions in the light of the information acquired about efficiency gains. In this
sense, our model provides a short-run analysis. As Amir et al. (2009) argue, this approach is
justified since the short-run period is the main focus of merger investigations.20 Moreover, our
main results hinge upon the presence of asymmetric information after the merger, which does not
necessarily arise from synergies. Practitioners are aware that a merger between regulated firms
tends to aggravate the regulator’s informational problem. This is because after the merger it
becomes more cumbersome to use benchmarking mechanisms in order to discipline the regulated
firm’s behavior.
8.2. Firms’ incentives to merge
Throughout the analysis, we do not explicitly deal with the merger decision of regulated firms.
This point definitely deserves some discussion. In the absence of diversification, it is immediate
to see that regulated firms have an incentive to merge, since the merger entails (expected)
informational rents from privileged knowledge of efficiency gains.
This result clearly extends to the case of diversification into a Bertrand segment. To explore
the firms’ incentives to merge under Cournot competition, we compare the expected profits from
the merger with the profits in the absence of the merger, which only arise from competitive
activities. Using the binding incentive constraint (12), a merger is profitable if and only if
E
[
pimcdr + pi
11
(
q˜mcd1r
)
+ pi21
(
q˜mcd2r
)]
= ν∆θ
(
q˜mcd1rl
)2
+ 2pi11
(
q˜mcd1rl
)
> 2pi11 (qc1r) .
Since the post-merger regulated output of the inefficient firm is lower than the output without
the merger, q˜mcdirl < q
c
ir, i = 1, 2, a merger is always proposed when goods are substitutes. This
is because the merging firms obtain (expected) informational rents from regulated activities
20A long-run analysis is much more demanding, since it requires the identification of other potential contributing
factors, such as industry-specific or economy-wide shocks. This explains why most empirical studies consider
horizons extending only 3 to 5 years.
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and higher competitive profits due to downward regulated output distortions. When goods are
complements, the post-merger reduction in regulated production of the inefficient firm dampens
competitive profits. Therefore, a merger is profitable if the informational rents from regulated
activities outweigh the lower profits from competitive operations.
9. Concluding remarks and policy implications
In this paper we examine the welfare implications of a merger between regulated firms in the
presence of two main informational problems, namely, uncertainty and asymmetric information
about efficiency gains, when regulated firms interact with unregulated suppliers that operate in
a competitive segment of the market.
The merger between regulated firms entails a trade-off between the benefits of potential
efficiency gains from joint production and the costs of distortions in the regulatory policy due
to informational problems about post-merger costs. We show that, as a result of this trade-off,
the optimal merger policy depends on the intensity of competition in the unregulated part of the
market. In particular, more severe competition makes the optimal merger policy more lenient
with merging regulated firms. The rationale for this result is that more severe competition
induces firms to be more responsive to changes in their demand driven by distortions in the
regulatory policy due to informational problems. This reduces the allocative costs of regulatory
distortions and softens merger policy.
The optimal merger policy is also crucially affected by the possibility that regulated firms
diversify into the unregulated part of the market. When regulated and unregulated goods
exhibit some degree of complementarity, the diversified merged firm has a lower incentive to
manipulate its private information about efficiencies from the merger, since a lower regulated
quantity due to cost misrepresentation translates into lower demand and lower profits in the
competitive segment. Therefore, under complementarity, the regulated firm’s internalization of
competitive profits relaxes the regulator’s incentive problem, and weaker competition (which
generates higher profits) in the unregulated part of the market can lead to a more lenient merger
policy.
Our analysis provides support for the view of practitioners and policy makers that the effects
of mergers on regulatory policies deserve adequate investigation when assessing mergers between
regulated firms. For instance, the US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), whose
authorization is required for mergers and consolidations of energy utilities, emphasized in the
Order issued on February 16, 2012 that it considers the impact on rates and regulation when
scrutinizing a merger.21
It is well established in the theoretical and practical debate that mergers in unregulated
industries entail a trade-off between efficiency gains from joint production and enhanced market
power of merging firms, which results from a reduction in the number of rivals competing in
the market. Our analysis recommends that the study of the intensity of competition should be
extended to markets where merging regulated firms interact with unregulated suppliers.
Specifically, our results suggest that the merger policy involving regulated firms should be
more lenient in industries where liberalized segments of the market are characterized by intense
21See http://ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/2012/021612/E-2.pdf.
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competition. This can be the case in the telecommunications and energy sectors where network
operations are under regulatory control and retail services are highly competitive. In the US,
Canada and Europe, consumers can sometimes choose to purchase electricity and gas either in
the captive market from a regulated utility or in the free market from competitive suppliers.
In some circumstances, however, competition in liberalized segments of the market is weak,
for instance because of severe capacity constraints. This can occur in transportation, telecom-
munications and energy sectors when unregulated suppliers must undertake huge investments.
If regulated firms engage in the provision of unregulated services that are substitutes for the
regulated ones, antitrust authorities should toughen their stance towards mergers between regu-
lated firms. This could apply to regulated transportation utilities that also provide unregulated
bus services or regulated energy utilities which are also active in the free market. Conversely,
if regulated firms also provide goods which are complements for the regulated ones, the merger
between regulated firms should be assessed more favorably. This can be the case of energy
network utilities which also supply retail services, or local exchange carriers which also provide
long-distance telephone services or telephone equipment.
This conclusion warrants some remarks. In our analysis, we consider mergers between
regulated firms which are active in different regions and may diversify into a competitive segment
of the market where they operate. When a regulated firm expands into a competitive segment
of the market where the other firm is established, a merger clearly exhibits an anticompetitive
concern stemming from the enhanced market power in the unregulated segment. In this case,
antitrust authorities might approve the merger conditionally upon some structural remedies,
such as the divestiture of one competitive subsidiary.
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Appendix
This appendix collects the proofs.
Proof of Lemma 1. Since the maximand decreases in pii, we find pi
b
i = pi
c
i = 0, i = 1, 2, in
equilibrium. Under Bertrand competition, using the second-stage outcome qbiu (qir) = α−c−γqir
with pbiu = c and taking the first-order condition for qir yields (1− γ) (α− c)−
(
1− γ2) qir = 0,
i = 1, 2. Under Cournot competition, using the second-stage outcome qciu (qir) =
2
3 (α− c− γqir)
with pciu = α− qciu (.)− γqir and taking the first-order condition for qir yields (9− 4γ) (α− c)−(
9− 4γ2) qir = 0, i = 1, 2. Standard substitutions entail the results collected in the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2. Since the maximand decreases in pi, we find pimb = pimc = 0, in equilib-
rium. Under Bertrand competition, using the second-stage outcome qbiu (qir) = α−c−γqir with
pbiu = c and taking the first-order condition for qir yields (1− γ) (α− c)−
(
1− γ2) qir+θqjr = 0,
i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. Under Cournot competition, using the second-stage outcome qciu (qir) =
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2
3 (α− c− γqir) with pciu = α − qciu (.) − γqir and taking the first-order condition for qir yields
(9− 4γ) (α− c)− (9− 4γ2) qir + 9θqjr = 0, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. Standard substitutions entail the
results collected in the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 3. Using the results in Lemmas 1 and 2, we find that, under Bertrand
competition, welfare without the merger is CSb = 2(α−c)
2
1+γ and welfare with the merger is
CSmb = (2−2γ−θ)(α−c)
2
1−γ2−θ . Taking the difference between CS
mb and CSb yields (1−γ)(α−c)
2θ
(1−γ2−θ)(1+γ) > 0
if and only if θ = θh > 0. Analogously, under Cournot competition, taking the difference
between welfare with merger CSmc = 4(α−c)
2
9 +
(9−4γ)2(α−c)2
9(9−4γ2−9θ) and welfare without merger CS
c =
4(α−c)2
9 +
(9−4γ)2(α−c)2
9(9−4γ2) yields
(9−4γ)2(α−c)2θ
(9−4γ2−9θ)(9−4γ2) > 0 if and only if θ = θh > 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. Using the results derived in the proof of Lemma 3, we find that, under
Bertrand competition, expected welfare from the merger is E
[
CSmb
]
= ν (2−2γ−θh)(α−c)
2
1−γ2−θh +
(1− ν) (2−2γ−θl)(α−c)2
1−γ2−θl . Standard computations yield E
[
CSmb
]
> CSb if and only if condition
(5) in the proposition holds. Analogously, under Cournot competition, expected welfare from
the merger is E [CSmc] = 4(α−c)
2
9 +ν
(9−4γ)2(α−c)2
9(9−4γ2−9θh) +(1− ν)
(9−4γ)2(α−c)2
9(9−4γ2−9θl) . Standard computations
yield E [CSmc] > CSc if and only if condition (6) in the proposition holds.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof follows from the comparison between (5) and (6). The
non-negativity conditions on quantities entail νb ∈ (0, 1) and νc ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Lemma 4. The incentive constraint (7) and the participation constraint pirl ≥ 0
imply pirh ≥ 0, which is therefore slack in equilibrium. Moreover, (7) and pirl ≥ 0 must be
binding at the optimal contract, otherwise the regulator could increase welfare via an adequate
reduction in the firm’s transfers. We check ex post that the incentive constraint (8) is satisfied,
which is the case if and only if the monotonicity condition q1rhq2rh ≥ q1rlq2rl (that follows
from adding (7) and (8)) holds. Under Bertrand competition, using the second-stage outcome
qbiu (qir) = α− c− γqir with pbiu = c and taking the first-order conditions for qirh and qirl yields
(1− γ) (α− c)−(1− γ2) qirh+θhqjrh = 0 and (1− γ) (α− c)−(1− γ2) qirl+θlqjrl−∆θφqjrl = 0,
i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. Under Cournot competition, using qciu (qir) = 23 (α− c− γqir) and pciu =
α−qciu (.)−γqir, we find after some manipulation (9− 4γ) (α− c)−
(
9− 4γ2) qirh+9θhqjrh = 0
and (9− 4γ) (α− c)−(9− 4γ2) qirl+9θlqjrl−9∆θφqjrl = 0, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. Usual substitutions
imply the results in the lemma. Since the condition q1rhq2rh ≥ q1rlq2rl holds, the incentive
constraint (8) is also satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 3. From Lemma 4 we find that expected welfare C˜S
mb
from the merger
in the presence of Bertrand competition can be written after some manipulation in the following
way
(α− c)2 + ν (1− γ)
2 (α− c)2
1− γ2 − θh +
(1− ν) (1− γ)2 (α− c)2
1− γ2 − θl + ∆θφ
= (α− c)2 +
(
1− γ2 − θh + ∆θφ
)
(1− γ)2 (α− c)2
(1− γ2 − θh) (1− γ2 − θl + ∆θφ) .
From Lemma 1 welfare without the merger is CSb = 2(α−c)
2
1+γ . It follows that C˜S
mb
> CSb if
and only if condition (10) in the proposition holds. The non-negativity conditions on quantities
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entail ν˜b ∈ (νb, 1).
Expected welfare C˜S
mc
from the merger in the presence of Cournot competition can be
written after some manipulation as follows
4 (α− c)2
9
+
ν (9− 4γ)2 (α− c)2
9 (9− 4γ2 − 9θh) +
(1− ν) (9− 4γ)2 (α− c)2
9 (9− 4γ2 − 9θl + 9∆θφ)
=
4 (α− c)2
9
+
(
9− 4γ2 − 9θh + 9∆θφ
)
(9− 4γ)2 (α− c)2
9 (9− 4γ2 − 9θh) (9− 4γ2 − 9θl + 9∆θφ) . (18)
From Lemma 1 we find that welfare without the merger is CSc = 4(α−c)
2
9 +
(9−4γ)2(α−c)2
9(9−4γ2) . It
follows that C˜S
mc
> CSc if and only if condition (11) in the proposition holds. The non-
negativity conditions on quantities entail ν˜c ∈ (νc, 1).
Proof of Proposition 4. Using (5) and (10) yields ν˜b−νb = − (1−γ
2−θh)2θhθl
(1−γ2)[θ2h−(1−γ2)θl]∆θ
. Moreover,
we find from (6) and (11) that ν˜c−νc = − (9−4γ
2−9θh)2θhθl
(9−4γ2)[9θ2h−(9−4γ2)θl]∆θ
. Standard computations entail
ν˜c − νc ≥ ν˜b − νb, where the equality holds if and only if γ = 0. Combining terms yields the
result in the proposition.
Proof of Lemma 5. In line with the proof of Lemma 4, we consider the incentive constraint
(12) and the participation constraint pirl ≥ 0 binding at the optimal contract, otherwise the
regulator could increase welfare via an adequate reduction in the firm’s transfers. We check ex
post that the monotonicity condition (14) and the participation constraint pirh ≥ 0 hold. Using
qciu (qir) =
2
3 (α− c− γqir) and pciu = α− qciu (.)−γqir, the first-order conditions for qirh and qirl
are respectively (9− 6γ) (α− c)− (9− 4γ2) qirh + 9θhqjrh + 2γ2qirh = 0 and (9− 4γ) (α− c)−(
9− 4γ2) qirl + 9θlqjrl − 9∆θφqjrl − 2γ2φqirl = 0, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. Usual substitutions imply
the results in the lemma. For γ ≥ 0, sufficient condition for the monotonicity condition (14) to
be satisfied is θl ≤ 13
(√
3− 2). Alternatively, we must have θh ≥ 2γ 1−γ9−4γ . For γ < 0, (14) is
always satisfied. Moreover, for γ ≥ 0, the participation constraint pirh ≥ 0 is always fulfilled.
For γ < 0, sufficient, but not necessary, condition for pirh ≥ 0 to be satisfied is that |γ| is not
too high.
Proof of Proposition 5. From Lemma 5 we find that expected welfare C˜S
mcd
from the
merger can be written after some manipulation in the following way
4 (α− c)2
9
+
ν (3− 2γ)2 (α− c)2
3 (3− 2γ2 − 3θh) +
(1− ν) (9− 4γ + 2γφ)2 (α− c)2
9 [9− 4γ2 − 9θl + (2γ2 + 9∆θ)φ] .
Combining terms yields
4 (α− c)2
9
+
[
(9− 4γ)2 + 4γ2φ
] (
3− 2γ2 − 3θh
)
+ 3 (3− 2γ)2 (2γ2 + 9∆θ)φ
9 (3− 2γ2 − 3θh) [9− 4γ2 − 9θl + (2γ2 + 9∆θ)φ] (α− c)
2 . (19)
From Lemma 1 we find that welfare without the merger is CSc = 4(α−c)
2
9 +
(9−4γ)2(α−c)2
9(9−4γ2) . Taking
22
the difference between C˜S
mcd
and CSc yields after some manipulation
9 (9− 4γ)2 (3− 2γ2 − 3θh) θl + φ{∆θ [2γ (57γ − 8γ3 − 54)+ 3θh (9− 4γ)2]
+2γ2
[
6 (1− γ)2 + θh
(
21 + 8γ2 − 24γ)]} ,
which is negative if the expression in curly brackets is negative. When goods are substitutes,
i.e., γ ≥ 0, this is the case for θh ≤ θ∗h (γ), with
θ∗h ≡
4γ − 4γ2 + 9θl − 4γθl
2 (9− 4γ) +
√
9θl [8γ (2γ − 3θl)− 3 (8γ − 9θl)] + 16γ2θl [2γ (3− 2γ) + 3θl]
2
√
3 (9− 4γ) ≥ 0,
where the equality holds if and only if γ = 0. For θh > θ
∗
h, we have C˜S
mcd
> CSc if and only
if condition (15) in the proposition holds. Under complementarity, i.e., γ < 0, the expression
in curly brackets is always positive. Then, we find C˜S
mcd
> CSc if and only if condition (15)
holds.
Proof of Proposition 6. Taking the difference between C˜S
mcd
in (19) and C˜S
mc
in (18)
yields C˜S
mcd − C˜Smc S 0 if and only if γ T 0. This is because the regulator faces the
same maximization problem, subject to the same participation constraints, while the incentive
constraint (12) is stricter (weaker) than (7) for γ > (<) 0 (the constraints (8) and (13) are
implied by the monotonicity condition (14)). Then, we have φ˜cd T φ˜c if and only if γ T 0.
Alternatively, this result follows from the comparison between (15) and (17). Using Proposition
4, we find for γ ≥ 0 that φ˜cd ≥ φ˜c ≥ φ˜b (where the equality holds if and only if γ = 0). For
γ < 0, using (15) and (16), we find φ˜b > φ˜cd if θh < θ˜h (γ), where
θ˜h ≡
2
(
1− γ2) (54− 57γ + 8γ3)
3 [36− γ (65− 24γ)] > 0.
Standard computations yield ∂θ˜h∂γ = 6
(65−48γ)(54−57γ−54γ2+65γ3−8γ5)
(108−195γ+72γ2)2 − 2
57+108γ−195γ2+40γ4
108−195γ+72γ2 > 0,
where the inequality follows from the assumptions on the parameters of the model.
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